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 OPINION 
                             
 
Cowen, Circuit Judge. 
 
  Gene Beatty appeals from two orders of the Benefits 
Review Board of the United States Department of Labor that denied 
him benefits under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (as amended), and its applicable 
implementing regulations.  The question presented in this appeal 
is whether Beatty is entitled to benefits if he is able to prove 
a total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal 
mining employment in combination with other nonrespiratory or 
nonpulmonary impairments.  The Director, Office of Workers' 
  
Compensation Programs, argues1 that a worker must be totally 
disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary condition, and not due 
to other nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary ailments, in order to 
qualify for benefits.  Although this is a close question, and one 
on which we have received little guidance from Congress, we 
conclude that the Director's position is reasonable.  




  Gene Beatty began working in coal mining in 1968.  He 
ran a cutting machine and worked as a mechanic.  His last job was 
as a beltman, where his duties included keeping the belt clean, 
assembling and greasing it, shoveling coal that fell off of it, 
and rock dusting.  In each of these jobs, his lungs were 
continuously exposed to coal dust. 
  Beatty worked for Danri Corporation and Triangle 
Enterprises until June 15, 1983, at which time he suffered a 
stroke.  He has not worked in the mines, or anywhere else, since 
                     
1
.  Danri Corporation and Triangle Enterprises advance the same 
argument as the Director.  For expediency purposes we will simply 
refer to their collective position as that of the Director.  With 
respect to any deference arguments made throughout the opinion 
concerning the Director, however, we obviously do not mean to 
suggest that Danri Corporation and Triangle Enterprises should be 
accorded any deference. 
 Additionally, counsel for Danri Corporation and Triangle 
Enterprises informed this Court at oral argument that it is 
Triangle Enterprises who is the relevant employer for purposes of 
this appeal.  Since this assertion was unchallenged by Beatty, we 
accept it as accurate.     
  
that date.  Until his stroke, his attendance record at work was 
good. 
  Beatty filed an application for benefits with the 
Department of Labor on June 17, 1985, pursuant to the federal 
black lung program.  A formal hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") was conducted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on 
March 9, 1988, at which all parties were afforded a full 
opportunity to present evidence and argument.  The ALJ found that 
Beatty was entitled to benefits. 
  The employer appealed from the ALJ's decision awarding 
benefits and the Benefits Review Board ("BRB") vacated the ALJ's 
decision in part.  The BRB ruled that Beatty had failed to 
establish a total disability as required by 20 C.F.R. § 
718.204(c).2  According to the BRB, a claimant must establish 
that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment is totally 
disabling and nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary impairments have no 
bearing on establishing total disability.  The BRB, therefore, 
                     
2
.  Section 718.204(c)(4), the section under scrutiny in this 
case, states: 
 
 Where total disability cannot be established under 
paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2) or (c)(3) of this section, or where 
pulmonary function tests and/or blood-gas studies are medically 
contraindicated, total disability may nevertheless be found if a 
physician exercising reasoned medical judgment, based on 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 
techniques, concludes that a miner's respiratory or pulmonary 
condition prevents or prevented the miner from engaging in 
employment as described in paragraph (b) of this section[.] 
 
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(4) (1993). 
  
remanded the case to the ALJ for consideration of the total 
disability issue. 
  On remand, the ALJ conducted a review of the evidence 
of total disability consistent with the BRB's ruling.  The 
medical evidence is summarized as follows: 
  Dr. Petsonk: Beatty had pneumoconiosis and this 
condition was related to his coal mine employment.  Beatty had no 
limitations in walking, climbing stairs, lifting weights, or 
carrying weight any distance due to a pulmonary disease.  Since  
Beatty's stroke, he walks with a cane and a brace. 
  Dr. Silverman: Beatty was obviously totally and 
permanently disabled with the sequelae of his previous stroke, 
and it was the primary focus of his disability.  Beatty did have 
some coal mine exposure and respiratory symptoms.  In his 
opinion, Beatty had pneumoconiosis which occurred as a result of 
his exposure to coal dust in the mines which made, "some 
contribution" to his overall disability. 
  Dr. Alpern: Beatty had black lung disease and moderate 
ventilatory insufficiency.  Although Beatty had arteriosclerotic 
heart disease and residuals of a cerebral vascular accident with 
left hemiparesis, Beatty was totally disabled from his black lung 
disease. 
  Dr. Sachs: Beatty was totally and permanently disabled 
on the basis of his stroke and, perhaps, his arteriosclerotic 
heart disease.  Beatty was not disabled due to a pulmonary 
condition.  There was no evidence of pulmonary impairment due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
  
ALJ Decision and Order on Remand at 2-3 (June 18, 1992).  
  The ALJ found the reports of Drs. Petsonk and Sachs to 
be most credible.  The ALJ reasoned that both of these physicians 
had conducted blood gas studies as well as vent studies to reach 
their conclusions, while Drs. Silverman and Alpern did not have 
the benefit of blood gas results.  Further, the ALJ noted that 
Dr. Sachs was board-certified in internal medicine as well as in 
pulmonary diseases, whereas Dr. Alpern was not board-certified in 
pulmonary diseases.  Additionally, the ALJ explained that Dr. 
Sachs challenged the pulmonary function studies conducted by Dr. 
Alpern and felt that they were invalid because these studies did 
not meet the recommended criteria for such tests.  The ALJ found 
that Dr. Sachs' view was supported by the applicable regulations. 
  Based on this evidence, the ALJ found that Beatty was 
not entitled to benefits because Beatty was not disabled due to a 
respiratory or pulmonary condition, but rather due to other 
conditions including his stroke.  On appeal, the BRB affirmed the 
ALJ's decision and denied Beatty benefits.  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
  The Benefits Review Board had jurisdiction in this 
matter by virtue of 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), incorporating 33 U.S.C. § 
921(b)(3).  This Court has jurisdiction over Beatty's appeal 
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), incorporating 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).  
Beatty appeals from a final order of the BRB dated March 25, 
1994, and an interlocutory order dated November 20, 1991, which 
is now ripe for appeal.    
  
 III. 
  The federal black lung program, first enacted as Title 
IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 96-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969), provides benefits to miners 
who have pneumoconiosis, a disease arising from exposure to coal 
dust during coal mine employment.  Judge Mansmann's scholarly 
opinion in Bonessa v. United States Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726, 
727-730 (3d Cir. 1989), analyzed the legislative history of the 
federal black lung program and the alternatively constricting and 
liberalizing amendments to the Act which include the Black Lung 
Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972), 
the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 
92 Stat. 95 (1978), the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635-39 (1981), and the Black Lung 
Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643-45 
(1981).  Since Beatty filed his claim for benefits after 1982, 
his claim is governed by the Act, as amended, and by the 
Department of Labor's permanent regulations codified at 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718 (1993). 
  Beatty's claim on appeal is that the ALJ and the BRB 
applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating his claim for 
black lung benefits.  A miner who is "totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis" may receive black lung benefits.  30 U.S.C. § 
901(a); 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(a).  According to Beatty, the Act and 
its implementing regulations require a fact finder to assess 
whether the miner is totally disabled by reference to the miner's 
pneumoconiosis, his other respiratory or pulmonary conditions, 
  
and his other nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary impairments, not 
merely by reference to the miner's respiratory or pulmonary 
impairments.  Beatty calls his position a "full contribution" 
standard.  The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, argues that a worker must be totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis and any other respiratory or pulmonary 
impairments, not due to other nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary 
ailments, in order to qualify for benefits.  Beatty has dubbed 
this standard a "limited contribution" standard, and we adopt 
this nomenclature as a useful shorthand.3  
  In Bonessa, we determined that it was error for the BRB 
to require a claimant to prove that his total disability was due 
solely to pneumoconiosis.  Bonessa, 884 F.2d at 731.  We 
explained, however, that a miner must show that pneumoconiosis is 
a substantial contributing cause to the total disability.  Id. at 
734.  Today we are called upon to fill a gap left by our decision 
                     
3
.  The standard is one of "limited contribution" because it 
allows impairments other than pneumoconiosis to "contribute" 
towards proving a total disability (i.e., other respiratory and 
pulmonary impairments), but is "limited" because it does not 
allow nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary impairments to be counted 
unless they are caused by pneumoconiosis. 
 We wish to make perfectly clear that the Director does not 
dispute that nonrespiratory and nonpulmonary impairments which 
are caused by pneumoconiosis count toward the definition of total 
disability.  Indeed, the definition of pneumoconiosis was 
expanded in 1978 to include its "sequelae."  30 U.S.C. § 902(b).  
A "sequela" is "any lesion [loss of function] or affection 
[affliction] following or caused by an attack of disease."  
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1509 (27th ed. 1988).  
Accordingly, impairments caused by pneumoconiosis, respiratory or 
not, count towards the definition of total disability.  The 
Director takes issue with counting nonrespiratory and 
nonpulmonary impairments that are unrelated to pneumoconiosis.   
  
in Bonessa and determine whether pneumoconiosis may be combined 
with other unrelated nonrespiratory and nonpulmonary conditions 
in proving whether the miner is totally disabled (i.e., whether a 
full contribution or a limited contribution standard is 
appropriate). 
  Because Beatty's claim involves an interpretation of a 
statute by an agency which administers it, to the extent that the 
statute is ambiguous, the question for the Court is whether the 
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-82 
(1984).  As the Supreme Court has explained, the reviewing court 
"need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one 
it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or 
even the reading the court would have reached if the question 
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."  Id. at 843 n.11, 
104 S. Ct. 2782 n.11 (citations omitted).  In addition, to the 
extent that Beatty's claim involves an interpretation of the 
Department of Labor's regulations, we defer to the Director's 
consistent interpretation of those regulations unless this 
interpretation is "`plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulations'"  Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, 766 F.2d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S. Ct. 792, 801-
02 (1965)).4 
                     
4
.  Congress has delegated rule-making powers under the Act to 
the Secretary of Labor.  The Secretary of Labor has redelegated 
  
  For purposes of Beatty's claim, the Act provides that 
the term "total disability" has the meaning given it by the 
regulations of the Secretary of Labor provided the Secretary 
complies with certain enumerated restrictions.  30 U.S.C. § 
902(f)(1) (1988).  Beatty raises three arguments based on the 
Act, and two arguments based on the regulations, to support his 
position that a full contribution standard is appropriate.  In 
addition, Beatty argues that the Director's position is not 
entitled to deference.  We will discuss each of these arguments 
seriatim.  
 A. The Act  
 1. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(C) 
  Among the restrictions with which the Secretary must 
comply in promulgating regulations under the Act is that "such 
regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than 
those applicable under section 423(d) of Title 42."  30 U.S.C. § 
902(f)(1)(C).  According to Beatty, the statutory command of § 
902(f)(1)(C) compels the conclusion that in assessing a claim for 
benefits under the Act an ALJ must look to all of a miner's 
physical impairments in order to determine whether the miner is 
(..continued) 
all of his powers under the Act to the Director.  Because the 
Director is the Secretary's delegate with respect to the Act, we 
owe deference to the Director's interpretation.  Bethlehem Mines, 
766 F.2d at 130.  One exception to this proposition occurs when 
the Secretary's interpretation conflicts with the Director's 
interpretation.  See Elliot Coal Mining Co., Inc. v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 17 F.3d 616, 627 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  We will examine this possibility in conjunction with 
Beatty's other arguments against according the Director 
deference.  See discussion infra part III.C.      
  
totally disabled.  Beatty points to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) in 
support of his position. 
  Section 423(d)(2)(B), a section of the Social Security 
Act, states: 
 
 In determining whether an individual's physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical 
severity that such impairment or impairments could be the 
basis of eligibility under this section, the Secretary shall 
consider the combined effect of all of the individual's 
impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, 
if considered separately, would be of such severity.  If the 
Secretary does find a medically severe combination of 
impairments, the combined impact of the impairments shall be 
considered throughout the disability determination process. 
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).  Beatty asserts 
that this statutory language prevents the Secretary from 
promulgating regulations which determine total disability only by 
reference to respiratory or pulmonary impairments, and not by 
reference to the totality of a miner's impairments. 
  The Director's position is that the Act was not 
intended to be a universal workers' compensation program, but 
rather a compensation program that focuses on the miner's 
respiratory or pulmonary conditions caused by the unique problems 
of coal mining.  In support of this position, the Director 
provides an alternative reading of the applicable statutory 
provisions.  According to the Director, the "no more restrictive 
criteria" phrase in § 902(f)(1)(C) refers to 42 U.S.C. § 
423(d)(2)(A) which states that: 
 An individual shall be determined to be under a 
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or 
impairments are of such severity that he is not only 
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 
  
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 
the national economy . . . .  
The Director asserts that in using the phrase "no more 
restrictive criteria" Congress was simply concerned that the 
total disability standard take into account such factors as age, 
education, and work experience. 
  The Director's position is borne out by the legislative 
history concerning the 1972 amendments to the Act.  The section 
of the Senate report entitled "Definition of Total Disability" 
contains a statement of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare's intent in changing the definition of total disability: 
 By providing that criteria established under this definition 
shall not be more restrictive than those applicable under 
Section 223(d) of the Social Security Act, this section 
assures that due weight shall be given to such factors as 
age, education and previous work experience in the 
application of the revised definition of total disability, 
in order to insure as broad coverage as possible. 
S. Rep. No. 743, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1972), reprinted in 
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2321.  Accordingly, we cannot agree that 
§ 902(f)(1)(C) decisively answers this question in favor of 
Beatty. 
 
 2.  30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(2)(C) 
  Beatty's next argument is that § 931(b)(2)(C) of the 
Act supports his full contribution standard.  The Act provides 
that after a certain period, claims for benefits would be shifted 
to state workers' compensation programs approved as adequate 
under statutory standards.  30 U.S.C. § 931(a).  Beatty notes 
  
that § 931(b)(2)(C) provides that a state program can be approved 
if its standards are "substantially equivalent" to the federal 
standards.  Beatty asserts that state workers' compensation 
statutes have traditionally adhered to a full contribution 
standard.  Accordingly, Beatty argues that § 931(b)(2)(C) 
evidences Congress' expectation that the regulations implementing 
30 U.S.C. § 902(f) would incorporate a full contribution 
standard. 
  We believe that Beatty's interpretation of this section 
is unwarranted.  One of the reasons that the black lung benefits 
program was enacted was because few states provided for such 
benefits.  30 U.S.C. § 901(a).  Accordingly, it defies logic to 
argue that Congress intended to incorporate specific state 
causation standards into its Act.  Further, despite Beatty's 
arguments to the contrary,5 we can see no obvious flaw in the 
position espoused by the Director that the federal program merely 
provides minimum standards for the states to meet.  As the 
Director points out, if the states wanted to be more generous in 
awarding benefits, they could be.  Additionally, as the Director 
notes, the Department of Labor regulations make clear that the 
federal program provides only minimum standards for the states to 
meet.  20 C.F.R. § 722.146.  Thus, we are unable to conclude that 
§ 931(b)(2)(C) dictates the result Beatty desires in this case. 
                     
5
.  Beatty makes the textual argument that because Congress used 
the phrase "substantially equivalent to" instead of "no more 
restrictive than" in § 931(b)(2)(C), it could not have 
contemplated approving more generous state standards.  We do not 
believe Congress intended to place a ceiling on state benefits by 
using the "substantially equivalent" phraseology.  
  
 
 3.  30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(A) 
  Beatty's final statutory argument is based on § 
902(f)(1)(A) of the Act which provides that "a miner shall be 
considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him or 
her from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and 
abilities comparable to [his or her past coal mine work]." 
(emphasis added).  To support his argument, Beatty refers to the 
dictionary definition of the word "prevent," which he states as 
"to stop, keep, or hinder [a person or other agent] from doing 
something." (citing The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)).  
According to Beatty, the dictionary definition of "prevent" 
indicates that if a number of factors contribute to "preventing" 
a particular result -- for example, if pneumoconiosis and various 
nonrespiratory and nonpulmonary impairments "prevent" a miner 
from working -- then any one of the factors may be said to 
"prevent" the result. 
  We find that this linguistic argument is of no avail to 
Beatty.  Indeed, it merely begs the question of how to construe 
the phrase "when pneumoconiosis prevents."  The phrase "when 
pneumoconiosis prevents" is ambiguous because it does not state 
the precise role pneumoconiosis must play in disabling the miner.  
One possible interpretation is that pneumoconiosis must be the 
sole cause of the miner's inability to engage in his past work.  
We rejected this notion in Bonessa.  884 F.2d at 731.  Other 
possibilities include both the full contribution and limited 
contribution standards advanced by the parties in this case.  
  
Accordingly, Beatty's reference to the dictionary definition of 
the word "prevent" does not lead us toward a specific conclusion 
in this case. 
 
 B. The Regulations 
  Beatty's next claim is that the relevant regulations 
implementing the Act require a full contribution standard.  He 
advances two arguments to support his contention.  First, he 
asserts that the history of the successive regulations, 
particularly the interim regulations governing the black lung 
program, dictate a full contribution standard.  Second, Beatty 
asserts that the relevant regulations parallel the language of 
the statute itself and dictate a full contribution standard. We 
are unpersuaded by Beatty's arguments. 
  The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA) 
granted the Secretary of Labor authority to establish total 
disability regulations for certain classes of cases.  Pending 
issuance of the new permanent regulations, the BLBRA provided for 
interim regulations applying standards different from (and more 
generous than) the regulations that had previously been in 
effect.6  Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 110, 109 
S. Ct. 414, 418 (1988).  The Director concedes that the interim 
regulations incorporated a full contribution standard.  
Nevertheless, the Director argues that the interim regulations 
                     
6
.  The regulations previously in effect were the permanent 
regulations established by the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare. 
  
and the permanent regulations stem from different Congressional 
concerns.  According to the Director, the interim regulations 
were designed to speedily process a large backlog of claims, 
while the permanent regulations were more concerned with accuracy 
in adjudicating claims. 
  Whether or not the Director has accurately portrayed 
Congress' intent in authorizing the interim regulations, we find 
that the interim regulations have little relevance to the issue 
here.  The issue before the Court is the proper interpretation of 
the Secretary of Labor's permanent regulations.  Accordingly, we 
find Beatty's first argument to be of little value. 
  Beatty's second argument, that the relevant regulations 
parallel the language of the Act itself and dictate a 
contribution standard, is simply belied by the text of the 
regulations.  The relevant Department of Labor regulation states 
that "total disability may . . . be found if a physician 
exercising reasoned medical judgment . . . concludes that a 
miner's respiratory or pulmonary condition prevents or prevented 
the miner from engaging in employment . . . ."  20 C.F.R. § 
718.204(c)(4).  Further, the regulations state that proof that a 
miner suffers from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary 
impairment is "not, by itself sufficient to establish that the 
miner's impairment is or was due to pneumoconiosis."  20 C.F.R. §  
718.204(c)(5).  Accordingly, the regulations require the miner to 
establish that he has pneumoconiosis, and also that he is totally 
disabled.  The Act, by contrast, simply states that a miner is 
totally disabled if "pneumoconiosis prevents him or her from 
  
engaging in gainful employment . . . ."   30 U.S.C. § 
902(f)(1)(A).  The Act does not further define how to analyze the 
phrase when "pneumoconiosis prevents."  Thus, the regulations set 
out a more specific formula for resolving these claims than does 
the Act, a formula that allows a claimant to include all 
respiratory or pulmonary impairments in establishing total 
disability.  The regulations do not contemplate inclusion of 
nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary impairments as Beatty asserts. 
  To bolster his second argument, Beatty asserts that 
only his construction of the Part 718 regulations (a full 
contribution construction) makes them consistent with the 
statute.  Beatty notes that regulations must be construed, if at 
all possible, to be consistent with the governing statute.  See 
Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171, 
109 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (1989).  The problem with Beatty's argument 
is that he is evaluating the regulations under his own reading of 
the statute.  Because we demonstrated in the last section that 
Beatty is incorrect in his assertion that the statute clearly 
incorporates a full contribution standard, Beatty's regulatory 
argument is mere bootstrapping.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded 
by Beatty's regulatory arguments.7        
                     
7
.  Beatty also argues that Bonessa resolves this dispute by 
declining to construe total disability "due to" pneumoconiosis, 
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(a), to mean that pneumoconiosis must be the 
sole cause of a miner's total disability.  As we noted 
previously, the Bonessa decision focused on the proper standard 
of causation (whether sole cause or substantial contributing 
cause was the correct standard).  The Bonessa court did not 
decide the question of the range of other impairments 
pneumoconiosis could combine with to create a total disability.  
Further, in its opinion, the Bonessa court hinted at the proper 
  
  At best, Beatty's statutory and regulatory arguments 
disclose another possible construction of the Act and its 
implementing regulations.  Beatty has not demonstrated that the 
Act unambiguously dictates a full contribution standard.  
Similarly, Beatty has not demonstrated that the Director's 
interpretation of the applicable regulations is "plainly 
erroneous" or "inconsistent" with those regulations.  
Accordingly, we are inclined to uphold the Director's position. 
 
 C.  Whether Deference is Appropriate 
  Beatty's final contention is that the Director's 
position is not entitled to deference.  To support this position, 
Beatty advances four arguments.  First, Beatty argues that 
because the Director is merely a delegatee of the Secretary, the 
Secretary's interpretation must prevail over the Director's if 
the two are in conflict.  He cites Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Program, 17 F.3d 616, 
627 (3d Cir. 1994), in support of this proposition. 
  Unfortunately for Beatty, he fails to demonstrate any 
conflict between the Director's position and that of the 
Secretary.  Beatty argues that the Part 718 regulations (i.e., 
(..continued) 
resolution of the case before us when it commented that 
"[w]ithout a doubt, a miner seeking benefits must show that he is 
totally disabled not merely by a respiratory or pulmonary 
condition but by pneumoconiosis."  Bonessa, 884 F.2d at 729.  
Implicit in the Court's statement is the conclusion that it is 
the universe of respiratory or pulmonary impairments that is at 
issue in determining whether the miner is totally disabled, not 
the universe of all physical impairments.  
  
the Secretary's regulations), embody a full contribution standard 
and therefore the Director's interpretation of these regulations 
is in conflict with the Secretary's interpretation.  As we have 
explained, however, Beatty has not demonstrated that the Part 718 
regulations embody a full contribution standard.  Accordingly, 
Beatty's first argument against according the Director deference 
is fatally flawed. 
  Beatty's next argument is that deference to an 
administrative agency's construction of a statute is 
inappropriate if a court, employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction, is able to discern Congress' intent in 
enacting the measure.  For this proposition, Beatty cites 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 446, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (1987).  Beatty claims that 
the statutory text itself permits the Court to decide the 
question of the appropriate standard. 
  Once again, however, Beatty's argument is fatally 
flawed.  As we have previously determined, the text of the Act 
does not unambiguously embrace a full contribution standard.  We 
are not able to discern Congress' precise intent from the 
language presented to us in the Act.  Accordingly, Beatty's 
argument cannot succeed. 
  Beatty's third argument is that the Senate Committee 
report accompanying the 1977 Reform Act, in discussing its 
understanding of "total disability" under the Act, expressed the 
"expectation that the Secretary of Labor will promulgate 
standards which give the benefit of any doubt to the coal miner."  
  
S. Rep. No. 209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977).  Further, 
Beatty argues that the agency itself assumed this obligation by 
incorporating this expectation into its regulations at 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.3(c) (1993). 
  Both the full contribution standard urged by Beatty and 
the limited contribution standard urged by the Director allow 
impairments other than pneumoconiosis or its sequelae to be 
counted toward the definition of total disability.  Admittedly, 
Beatty's position is more generous toward miners than that of the 
Director.  We do not think, however, that the Director runs afoul 
of his duty of establishing regulations which give the benefit of 
the doubt to the claimants by promulgating and implementing 
regulations that place some limits on the kinds of impairments 
that a claimant can count towards establishing a total 
disability.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Beatty's 
argument. 
  Beatty's final argument is that the Director's current 
reading of the statute and the Part 718 regulations is 
inconsistent with her prior constructions and is merely expressed 
in a litigating position.  Beatty argues that under such 
circumstances it is inappropriate to accord the Director 
deference.  Beatty cites Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 
488 U.S. 204, 212-13, 109 S. Ct. 468, 473-474 (1988), in support 
of his position. 
  Beatty has not demonstrated any inconsistency in the 
position taken by the Director concerning the current Department 
of Labor regulations.  At best, Beatty can demonstrate some 
  
inconsistency between the interpretation of DOL's permanent 
regulations and its interim regulations.  As previously 
discussed, however, the interim regulations do not concern us 
here.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Beatty's argument that 
the Director's position is not entitled to deference. 
 
 IV. 
  In addition to Beatty's inability to provide a 
persuasive reason not to defer to the Director's position, we 
must point out that adhering to Beatty's view would produce 
undesirable consequences.  Under Beatty's view, a miner who has 
pneumoconiosis, but whose total disability is only 10% 
attributable to this disease, would be able to recover benefits 
if his completely unrelated physical problems (such as a stroke) 
created 90% of his total disability.  While a persuasive argument 
can be made (and is made by the Director) that the state of 
current medical science makes it difficult to distinguish between 
pneumoconiosis and other respiratory or pulmonary diseases, it is 
untenable that physical impairments that affect other parts of 
the body (such as a stroke) would often be indistinguishable from 
pneumoconiosis.8  While neither the Director's view nor Beatty's 
view will likely lead to a perfect test for compensation, we find 
the Director's view to be reasonable.  Accordingly, we reject 
                     
8
.  Beatty argues that some nonrespiratory and nonpulmonary 
impairments are difficult to distinguish from pneumoconiosis.  
While this may be the case in some instances, we do not believe 
these instances to be dispositive. 
  
Beatty's claim on appeal that a miner is entitled to benefits if 
he or she is able to prove a total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mining employment in 
combination with other unrelated nonrespiratory or nonpulmonary 
impairments.9 
  In announcing the position that we set forth today, we 
align ourselves with a recent decision of the Court of the 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which decided this very question.  
In that case, Jewell Smokeless Coal Corporation v. Junior Street, 
42 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 1994), the court deferred to the 
reasonable interpretation of the Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs and rejected the claimant's argument that a 
miner need only establish a total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis in combination with nonrespiratory and 
nonpulmonary impairments.   
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of 
the Benefits Review Board. 
                     
9
.  Because we reject Beatty's claim that the Board applied an 
inappropriate legal standard, we need not reach his other 
argument that the evidence of record, if scrutinized under 
Beatty's standard, obliges a judgment from this Court directing 
an outright award of benefits. 
